It’s been a privilege

Analysis
Insights

The dollar’s role in the global economy is evolving, and its “exorbitant privilege” looks to be as well. We examine the greenback’s role as the reserve currency and the implications of the world’s changing currency appetites.

Share

April 8, 2025

By Atul Bhatia, CFA

Key points

  • The dollar’s reserve status may not be as important to the U.S. economy as is often assumed.
  • Issuers of reserve currencies face fiscal and trade headwinds that are problematic for the U.S.
  • We think reserve holders are likely to slowly diversify into other currencies, helping reduce the risks of the transition.

“An exorbitant privilege” is how former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing once referred to the U.S. government’s ability to issue the global reserve currency.

And there’s no question – in our minds – that the dollar’s role as the world’s savings vehicle contributed to U.S. economic success in the last 75 years. But currency leadership has less helpful consequences as well, including fiscal and trade imbalances. With the dollar’s role in the global economy evolving – and in our view likely declining – we think this is an opportune moment for investors to consider what comes next and how changing currency appetites are likely to impact the global economy.

Contrary to popular wisdom, we believe there’s a strong case to be made that the exorbitant privilege of reserve status is now a net liability for the U.S. and that a shift to a more balanced global currency reserve basket is likely a more stable framework for global economic activity. At the same time, a potential declining role for the dollar represents the weakening of another global unifying force, with likely negative implications for U.S. leadership and possibly global political stability.

The good

Currency reserves are simply an economist’s way of describing how a nation chooses to store its savings. Countries save for many reasons, but their primary goal is to secure access to food, fuel, and other critical inputs in the event of a domestic economic crisis. Countries could choose to save these materials directly – like the U.S. does with its strategic petroleum reserve – but that requires significant storage and defense costs. Most countries instead hold a basket of foreign currencies, relying on their ability to trade those holdings for needed goods and services. Since World War II, the majority of world savings has been held in U.S. dollars; the greenback’s current share of global saving is roughly 60 percent.

This reliance on the U.S. currency for savings has two main implications.

First, countries that hold dollars want to make sure that trade continues to be denominated in dollars. They’ve bought into the ecosystem, and if trade starts shifting over to rubles or euros or yuan, then their dollar savings may not be helpful in a crisis. A country could try to switch to a different currency, but that’s an expensive – and risky – move: make the wrong choice or move too soon and your country could be locked out of vital markets. It’s much easier to perpetuate the current system and support the dollar as the trade vehicle.

For the U.S., having the dominant currency involved in global trade matters. The theoretical benefit is that it eliminates the risk that the U.S. cannot buy needed inputs. That’s nice, but given the size of the U.S. economy, not a lot of folks were losing sleep over that risk. The real benefit of the dollar’s role in trade, in our view, is that small and midsize U.S. companies have a much easier time expanding into export markets. Hedging currency risk is complicated and often involves a tradeoff between protecting margin and satisfying customers. A U.S.-based exporter selling in dollars avoids those costs and headaches, making it easier for firms to begin exporting earlier in their corporate development.

The other main benefit to having the reserve currency is that it helps keep government borrowing costs down. Once foreigners have acquired dollars, they need a low-risk, easily accessible way to hold them, and that tends to mean owning U.S. Treasury bonds. This demand for government securities has helped reduce long-term borrowing costs, giving a financial boost to the U.S.

Not all sunshine

But not all the consequences of being the source of the world’s reserve currency are positive.

To begin with, there’s the basic issue of how foreigners can acquire dollars. There are only three ways:

  • They can be given them, through financial aid;
  • They can borrow them, typically by having central banks exchange blocks of their respective currency in a so-called “currency swap” arrangement;
  • Or they can earn dollars through a trade surplus.

Since countries tend to grow their reserves over time, the U.S. effectively needs to run a persistent trade deficit if it wants the dollar to retain its share of reserves. The only alternative means of providing dollars to foreign savers is through large amounts of financial aid, potentially to strategic rivals, or by having the U.S. Federal Reserve run an extremely complicated and potentially risky book of multicurrency swap lines globally. Both alternatives are political and economic nonstarters, in our view, so the U.S. can choose between a trade deficit or a diminishing percentage of global reserves in the long run. It’s not a coincidence that the U.S. has run trade deficits for decades.

Once foreigners have acquired dollars, they need a place to store them, and that usually means Treasury bonds. The flipside of being the reserve currency and borrowing cheaply is that a country must issue enough debt to keep up with reserve holder demand. A key reason why countries have shied away from euro reserves, in our view, is the lack of truly eurozone-wide debt and the insufficiency of German and other perceived low-risk sovereign bonds. The recent push by Germany to expand issuance to fund defense spending could help increase the attractiveness of the euro as a reserve currency, in our view.

Certainly, U.S. fiscal deficits go well beyond what is required for foreign reserve growth, but even if the U.S. federal government shifted toward a more balanced budget, a persistent budget surplus is problematic for a reserve currency issuer.

Too expensive?

When the U.S. began running persistent fiscal deficits in the 1980s, the stock of federal debt outstanding was around 30 percent of GDP. Today, existing debt is closer to 120 percent of GDP. The numbers for trade are directionally similar, although to a lesser degree.

Separating out the impact of currency reserve status on debt accumulation and trade levels is beyond art versus science. There are simply too many variables moving simultaneously to reach robust conclusions.

We think it’s fair to say, however, that a reasonable person could conclude that the marginal cost of additional debt accumulation is higher at 120 percent of GDP than 30 percent of GDP, and that expanding U.S. trade deficits from their current levels will likely exacerbate domestic economic and political concerns. In short, the longer the U.S. runs these imbalances, the greater the costs become.

The benefits of reserve currency status, arguably, have not kept pace.

What comes next?

So far, we’ve been discussing the dollar’s reserve currency role and its implications for the U.S., but the issue is, of course, global in nature. For nations accumulating reserves, we see a real possibility that tariffs and their impact on international trade prove to be the driver for rethinking reserve strategy.

As we’ve discussed elsewhere, we think the Trump administration’s tariff policies are designed to exploit foreign nations’ reliance on American consumption. It’s an incredibly powerful lever, in our view, for the U.S., and by extension it’s a key strategic liability for both allies and rivals. While the Trump tariffs are the most immediate and explicit reminder of other countries’ economic dependence on the U.S., there’s a long history of Washington using unilateral economic sanctions and freezing dollar assets. This has generated significant international pushback and resentment, primarily from organisations like the BRICS, a multilateral group founded by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

Given the U.S.’s increasing willingness to flex its economic might, we would be surprised if countries did not seek to better balance their own internal supply and demand, reducing reliance on the U.S. consumer. The shift away from international trade is likely to lead to slower global growth as the efficiencies from trade are lost. This is a dynamic that has been going on for years, as we’ve previously discussed in our “Worlds apart” series, but we believe tariff threats are likely to accelerate the shift.

Countries tend to base their reserve balances on the value of their imports, so if countries shift away from trade and toward more of a balanced domestic economy, they will likely find themselves with excess reserves.

Our expectation is that most countries would maintain current reserve levels. This would essentially allow them to “grow into” their current stock of savings versus aggressively drawing down reserve totals to match a reduced import bill. The reason for our view is simple – drawing down reserves is a risky move, and central bankers by their nature tend to be risk averse.

Emerging currencies fill the space created by the U.S. dollar’s declining role in global reserves

Share of global currency reserves

Share of global currency reserves

The chart shows the percentage of global reserves held in various currencies: the U.S. dollar; the euro; other traditional reserve currencies (Japanese yen, British pound, Swiss franc); and major non-traditional reserve currencies (Chinese renminbi, Canadian dollar, Australian dollar). The percentage of reserves held in U.S. dollars fell to roughly 58% in 2023 from roughly 71% in 2000. Approximately half of the dollar’s decline was offset by increases in the major non-traditional reserve currencies, which were not significant before the early 2010s and now account for roughly seven percent of global reserves.

  • Other
  • Major non-traditional (CAD, AUD, RMB)
  • Other traditional (JPY, GBP, CHF)

Source – RBC Wealth Management, International Monetary Fund

Once nations re-enter a phase of reserve accumulation, we would expect them to add to their savings with a focus on non-dollar currencies. This is exactly the behaviour we’ve seen since the turn of the century.

The risk that a country would move to immediately shift its currency composition – essentially sell Treasuries and dollars and buy euros or yen – is mainly theoretical. No other currency offers sufficient high quality, stable value, liquid investment alternatives to act as a dollar replacement. Unless or until that changes, the practical choice, in our view, is dollar savings or lower savings.

If this interpretation proves correct, the short-term outcome is nearly ideal for the U.S. Investing nations would continue to roll over their Treasury holdings and dollar-based international trade would remain the norm. Some degree of regional trade would likely migrate to a different currency, but if most countries continue to hold Treasuries, the incentive to trade in U.S. dollars remains.

Longer term, the U.S. would no longer enjoy its exorbitant privileges, but it would also not face the inherent need to provide both dollars and debt to the world. Less helpfully, a world that is less dependent on the U.S. consumer is also less invested in the health of the U.S. economy. Historically, foreign nations have not had much reason to push hard during economic negotiations with the U.S.; after all, for most of the world a healthy U.S. economy was key for their domestic economies’ production and profits. From our vantage point, if and when countries shift toward regional trade partners and their own domestic buyers, all sorts of bilateral discussions look less cooperative and more like a zero-sum game.

Bretton Woods, Bancor, and beyond

The idea that the existence of a single reserve currency can create global imbalances is nothing new. John Maynard Keynes is perhaps best known for his statement that “in the long run, we’re all dead,” but he also was one of the first to identify the inherent instability of a single currency acting as the global reserve. He made a push at the Bretton Woods Conference in the 1940s to base international trade on a global unit of account called the Bancor, rather than the U.S. dollar.

The idea was to have all trade settled in Bancors and run through an international clearing union. Countries that ran either a Bancor surplus or a deficit would be charged a penalty rate on the imbalance. This would provide incentives for trade to remain largely balanced. The idea has been refloated on occasion, most notably following the global financial crisis, but it has failed to be adopted largely because, in our view, countries have been unwilling to cede that degree of control to an international body. While we think the idea of a global unit of account has significant merit, we see the geopolitical barriers as nearly insurmountable.

Instead of a radical transformation, we believe currency reserves are likely to go through an evolutionary process. Falling trade will lead to slower global growth and declining reserve needs, but the reduction will likely be done passively. Some countries may choose to rebalance part of their holdings away from the dollar, but the lack of “safe” investment options for non-dollar currencies will act as a constraint, in our opinion.

While any shift away from dollar reserves is likely to be presented as a negative for the U.S. economy, we are not convinced the facts support that interpretation. Instead, we think we’ve reached the point Keynes foresaw, where the fiscal and trade implications of issuing the reserve currency outweigh the rather limited benefits of reserve status.

In other words, we believe that in the long run Keynes may be dead, but he’s still got a point.

Let’s connect


We want to talk about your financial future.


This publication has been issued by RBC’s Wealth Management international division in the United Kingdom and the Channel Islands which is comprised of an international network of RBC® companies located in these jurisdictions and includes RBC Europe Limited and Royal Bank of Canada (Channel Islands) Limited. You should carefully read any risk warnings or regulatory disclosures in this publication or in any other literature accompanying this publication or transmitted to you by RBC’s Wealth Management international division.

This publication has been compiled from sources believed to be reliable, but no representation or warranty, express or implied is made to its accuracy, completeness or correctness. All opinions and estimates contained in this report are judgements as of the date of this report, are subject to change without notice and are provided in good faith but without legal responsibility. This report is not an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any securities. Past performance is not a guide to future performance, the value of investments and income arising can go down, future returns are not guaranteed, and an investor may not get back the amount originally invested. Countries throughout the world have their own laws regulating the types of securities and other investment products and services which may be offered to their residents, as well as the process for doing so. As a result, any securities or services discussed in this report may not be eligible for sale in some jurisdictions. This report is not, and under no circumstances should be construed as, a solicitation to act as a securities broker or dealer in any jurisdiction by any person or company that is not legally permitted to carry on the business of a securities broker or dealer in that jurisdiction. Nothing in this report constitutes legal, accounting or tax advice or individually tailored investment advice.

This material is prepared for general circulation and does not have regard to the particular circumstances or needs of any specific person who may read it. The investments or services contained in this report may not be suitable for you and it is recommended that you consult an independent investment advisor if you are in doubt about the suitability of such investments or services. To the full extent permitted by law none of the entities which comprise the international division of RBC Wealth Management nor any of their affiliates, nor any other person, accepts any liability whatsoever for any direct or consequential loss arising from any use of this report or the information contained herein. No matter contained in this document may be reproduced or copied by any means without the prior consent of RBC Wealth Management.

Clients of RBC Europe Limited may be entitled to compensation from the UK Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) if it cannot meet its obligations. This depends on the type of business and the circumstances of the claim. Most types of investment business are covered for up to a total of £85,000. For further information about the compensation provided by the FSCS scheme (including the amounts covered and eligibility to claim) please refer to the FSCS website FSCS.org.uk. Please note only compensation related queries should be directed to the FSCS. Royal Bank of Canada (Channel Islands) Limited is not covered by the UK Financial Services Compensation Scheme.

RBC Europe Limited is registered in England and Wales with company number 995939. Its registered office is 100 Bishopsgate, London EC2N 4AA. RBC Europe Limited is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority.

Royal Bank of Canada (Channel Islands) Limited (“the Bank”) is regulated by the Jersey Financial Services Commission in the conduct of deposit taking, fund services and investment business in Jersey. The Bank’s general terms and conditions are updated from time to time and can be found at https://www.rbcwealthmanagement.com/en-eu/terms-and-conditions. Registered office: Gaspé House, 66-72 Esplanade, St. Helier, Jersey JE2 3QT, Channel Islands. Deposits made with Royal Bank of Canada (Channel Islands) Limited in Jersey are not covered by the UK Financial Services Compensation Scheme. Royal Bank of Canada (Channel Islands) Limited is a participant in the Jersey Bank Depositors Compensation Scheme. The Scheme offers protection for ‘eligible deposits’ up to £50,000 per individual claimant, subject to certain limitations. The maximum total amount of compensation is capped at £100,000,000 in any 5 year period. Full details of the Scheme and banking groups covered are available on the Government of Jersey’s website http://www.gov.je/dcs or on request.

Investment services offered by the Bank are not covered by an investor compensation scheme as there is currently no such scheme operating in Jersey, however ‘eligible deposits’ held pursuant to investment services may be protected under the Bank Depositors Compensation Scheme described above – for more information see the Bank’s general terms and conditions. Some of the products that the Bank might recommend to you could be registered overseas and may be covered by a local compensation scheme. Your investment counsellor will provide you with the details of any overseas compensation schemes (where applicable) at the time of making an investment recommendation.

Copies of the latest audited accounts are available upon request from the registered office.
® / ™ Trademark(s) of Royal Bank of Canada. Used under licence.


Related articles

Worlds apart: Risks and opportunities as deglobalisation looms

Analysis 5 minute read
- Worlds apart: Risks and opportunities as deglobalisation looms

The U.S. deficit, interest rates, and private sector interplay

Analysis 6 minute read
- The U.S. deficit, interest rates, and private sector interplay

Tariffs’ leverage extends far beyond trade

Analysis 10 minute read
- Tariffs’ leverage extends far beyond trade