De-dollarisation: The dollar in doubt?


As the world realigns under deglobalisation, we examine the challenges to dollar dominance and whether the greenback is facing any true currency rivals.


October 4, 2023

By Alan Robinson

RBC Wealth Management’s “Worlds apart: Risks and opportunities as deglobalisation looms” series explores the trend away from globalisation and its ramifications for investors, economies, and financial markets. This article in the series focuses on the impacts of de-dollarisation.

Key points

  • The U.S. dollar is the world’s reserve currency and the backbone of the global payments infrastructure.
  • Countries that face restrictions over the use of this system due to sanctions would like to see an alternative.
  • If the dollar were to be supplanted, the U.S. would lose many benefits that accrue to the dollar’s reserve currency status.
  • The entrenched nature of the dollar in global finance, together with conflicting political goals amongst its detractors, suggests a practical replacement is unlikely.

The mighty greenback has reigned supreme as the world’s reserve currency since at least the abandonment of the gold standard in the 1970s, and likely since the end of World War II. It is also the world’s predominant currency for the transaction of goods and services between nations and trading blocs. The currency has cemented its status with the development of a global payments infrastructure during this time – simply put, it’s hard for countries and multinational companies to wean themselves off the U.S. dollar system.

But the rapid pivot away from liberalised trade agreements toward a multipolar protectionist world brings the dollar’s status back into focus. Sanctions imposed on Russia subsequent to its 2022 invasion of Ukraine raised the hackles of authoritarian regimes across the world as they realised there were few alternatives to the dollar world.

This has led to the idea of de-dollarisation – or the goal of creating a competitor to the dollar’s role as both a reserve currency and as a highway system for global transactions.

We look at the challenges of de-emphasising the dollar and its related global infrastructure and argue that the dollar’s “exorbitant privilege” as a reserve currency and payment system has few realistic challengers.

The more things change, the more they stay the same

The recent drumbeat of angst over the dollar’s status is nothing new. Historically, calls for the dollar to be supplanted as a reserve currency grow louder when one or more of several developments occur. A change in the long-term trend of the dollar’s valuation against other currencies, specifically when a strengthening trend pivots to a weakening trend, often triggers this debate. And U.S. partisan politics can play a part too, particularly if political dysfunction and fiscal woes prompt a downgrade of the country’s credit rating. Increasing geopolitical tensions and generational changes in the global order tend to sharpen the debate, and lastly, rapid technological change can open the door to rivals to the dollar’s status. In our view, all four factors are at play at this time.

The start of a new dollar bear market? Too early to say

Trade-weighted U.S. Dollar Index (DXY)

Trade-weighted U.S. Dollar Index (DXY)

Line chart showing the value of the trade weighted dollar index, with four distinct cycles averaging 9 years in length with moves of the order of 40% to 60%. The latest bull cycle may have ended in 2022 after an 11-year run.

Source – RBC Wealth Management, FactSet; monthly data from January 1985 through September 2023

What is de-dollarisation anyway?

De-dollarisation is the process of reducing the world’s reliance on the dollar as the world’s primary reserve currency and transaction currency for international business. This may occur naturally as technology and global growth provide more alternatives to the dollar, but some countries might want to nudge the process along for their geopolitical advantage.

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the dollar accounted for 59 percent of global currency reserves at the end of Q1 2023, down from more than 70 percent in 2001, but still well ahead of the euro at around 20 percent and the Japanese yen at around five percent. And the share of reserves really hasn’t changed much since the start of the war in Ukraine and the U.S. Treasury Department’s associated financial sanctions on Russia.

Contenders vs. pretenders: No big changes in global reserve currencies

Shares of global reserves held in major currencies

Shares of global reserves held in major currencies

Line chart showing the percentage of global currency reserves held in major currencies quarterly from Q1 2022 through Q2 2023. There has been little change from quarter to quarter over this period. The most visible change is a decrease in the U.S. dollar share from Q3 2022 to Q4 2022 (to roughly 58.6% from 60.1%), with a corresponding increase in the Euro (to 20.4% from 19.5%) and to a lesser extend the British pound. The most recent percentages are: U.S. dollar, 58.9%; euro, 20.0%; Japanese yen, 5.4%; British pound sterling, 4.9%; Chinese yuan, 2.5%; Australian dollar, 2.0%; Canadian dollar, 2.5%; other currencies, 4.0%.

  • U.S. dollar (USD)
  • Euro (EUR)
  • Japanese yen (JPY)
  • UK pound sterling (GBP)
  • Chinese yuan (CNY)
  • Canadian dollar (CAD)
  • Australian dollar (AUD)
  • Other

Source – RBC Wealth Management, World Bank; data as of 9/29/23

What could replace the dollar as a reserve currency? The two closest challengers, the euro and the yen, have grown their share of reserve holdings, but not to the extent of the dollar’s losses. And while China would like its renminbi to topple the dollar, that currency’s share of global reserves remains a paltry 2.5 percent, although certain authoritarian regimes seem increasingly attracted to the currency. For example, Russia currently holds about a third of all reserves in the Chinese currency.

We don’t think any single currency is positioned to replace the dollar in the global reserve system. Instead, we expect a gradual diversification into the many developed nation currencies of Asia and the rest of the world. Emerging market (EM) currencies will probably need to wait until the financial community develops enough trust in the soundness of EM economies.

Of course, official reserve accounting may hide the true picture of what’s going on behind the scenes. The U.S. and Chinese bond markets diverged after Q1 2023, with U.S. Treasury yields moving higher as investors sold these bonds and Chinese government bond yields heading in the opposite direction as buyers increased their purchases.

Are diverging yields a sign of de-dollarisation? Not so fast

Yields on benchmark 10-year government bonds in the U.S. and China

Yields on benchmark 10-year government bonds in the U.S. and China

Line chart showing the daily yields of 10-year government bonds in the US and China, with an added bar chart denoting the difference in yields. While U.S. yields moved higher after Q1 2023, Chinese yields moved lower, with the spread between them growing from 41 basis points near the start of April to 189 basis points near the end of September.

  • U.S. (left axis)
  • China (left axis)
  • Spread (basis points, right axis)

Source – RBC Wealth Management, FactSet; daily closing yields, 12/31/22–9/28/23

This coincided with increasing concerns in the financial media, including Bloomberg, that some sovereign funds were exchanging their dollar reserves for the Chinese currency. We think there’s an easier explanation. This divergence was a result of significant differences between the two economies. A solid labour market and resilient consumer in the U.S. have kept inflation higher than is comfortable for bondholders. Whereas real estate woes and tepid economic growth in China have prompted that country’s authorities to keep interest rates low.

Excuse me, your “exorbitant privilege” is showing

We don’t believe the dollar is at risk of losing its reserve currency status in the foreseeable future. And that’s a view that will be applauded by U.S. policymakers, as this status comes with a lot of benefits. This package of benefits is widely known as “The Exorbitant Privilege,” a term coined by French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in the 1960s.

One of the benefits is robust international demand for U.S. Treasury bonds. This demand allows the U.S. government to issue more debt, and at lower rates, than would be the case if the dollar lost its status. Why is demand for U.S. bonds so strong? Because foreign nations need a deep, liquid asset market in which to park their reserves.

The world’s largest savings account?

Share of overseas U.S. Treasury debt holdings by country/region

Share of overseas U.S. Treasury debt holdings by country/region

Bar chart showing the percentage of overseas-held U.S. federal debt by country and region. The largest foreign holder is the European Union with 21.6% of the overseas holdings followed by Japan at 14.5% and China at 13.4%. The rest of the foreign holders are: Other Asian countries, 9%; United Kingdom, 8.7%; All other, 9.5%; Latin America, 5.4%; Switzerland, 3.9%; Cayman Islands, 3.9%; Canada, 3.8%; Middle East, 3.3%, and India at 3.0%.

Source – RBC Wealth Management, U.S. Treasury Department; data as of August 2023

Another benefit is felt via the value of the currency itself. Foreign demand for the dollar depresses the value of overseas currencies, and therefore makes imports cheaper in dollar terms for U.S. consumers. Meanwhile, the foreign exporters get paid for their wares in U.S. dollars that then get invested in Treasury bonds, and so the cycle continues.

So, it would be natural for central bankers in other countries to be envious of this privilege. But these benefits also come with responsibilities. The reserve currency status requires a fully convertible currency and a free-floating exchange rate determined by financial markets. These requirements are unpalatable to some overseas central bankers who prefer to keep their own currency under close control – another reason for the dearth of alternatives to the dollar as a reserve currency.

This flexibility of the dollar cements its status as a reserve currency. It allows it to mop up excesses elsewhere in the world. Currently, there is a glut of savings outside of the U.S., and very little of those excess savings are placed in any currency other than the dollar.

Don’t “buck” the system

It’s not just the dollar’s reserve currency status that proponents of de-dollarisation are eyeing. Some nations are wary of the world’s reliance on the dollar within the global payments infrastructure. The ease with which the U.S. and its developed nation partners were able to implement asset freezes and sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine caught the attention of some countries worried they might someday get locked out of the system.

Over the last year, several countries have diversified the payment systems they use to trade goods, with a view to creating an alternative to the dollar’s hegemony in global trade.

Some of the higher-profile examples include Russia and Iran accepting Chinese renminbi for their oil sales. India has also stepped up its use of the Chinese currency, and authorities in Beijing claim that half of their cross-border payments are now conducted in renminbi. This is a natural consequence of the Chinese economy moving up the value chain, but it’s important to note that even with this progress, the renminbi still only accounts for two percent of global cross-border trade transactions and four percent of foreign exchange transactions.

This is because the dollar payment ecosystem offers advantages built up over generations that other currencies can’t provide. These include the ease of raising capital in dollars, and deep derivatives markets that facilitate hedging for global traders. So while there may be demand for alternatives to the dollar payment system, the supply of practical alternatives is likely to remain thin, in our view.

The U.S. dollar dominates the world of foreign exchange

Volume of global foreign exchange transactions by currency

Volume of global foreign exchange transactions by currency

Bar chart showing the share of foreign exchange volume by transaction currency. The USD is the most traded currency, as it is involved in 44.2% of global transactions. The euro is the next most used with a 15.3% share. Additional currencies shown on the chart are JPY, 8.3%; GBP, 6.4%; CNY, 3.5%; AUD, 3.2%; CAD, 3.1%; CHF, 2.6%, and Other, 13.3%.

Source – RBC Wealth Management, Bank for International Settlements; data as of 12/31/22

All in all, it’s just a few more BRICS in the wall

The expansion of the BRICS grouping of developing nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) announced during the bloc’s annual summit in August 2023 caught the attention of the de-dollarisation community, particularly given the tentative discussions toward the creation of a currency basket or some other alternative to the dollar.

However, our view is that the natural geopolitical tensions within the BRICS+ grouping, together with the reluctance of individual members to surrender the sovereignty of their own currencies, makes the advent of a new currency bloc unlikely. We believe the benefits to BRICS+ members derive from their ability to straddle the fence in terms of international relationships in the deglobalising world and expand trade and investment flows between countries. Any new BRICS financial infrastructure would likely be limited in scope and more of a bolt-on to the existing global financial architecture, at least over the foreseeable future.

Please see this brief commentary for more of our thoughts on the BRICS expansion.

Reports of the dollar’s demise are greatly exaggerated

We believe the increase in calls for a lessening of the greenback’s status as a reserve currency and medium of trade is a natural consequence of the secular trend of deglobalisation as weakening demographics and increasing nationalism create rifts in global geopolitics.

However, the dollar’s deeply embedded infrastructure within financial markets and global trade makes it difficult, in our view, for alternative currencies to take a significant share of the dollar’s role on the global stage. We expect the push to de-dollarise to remain in the headlines, but to not significantly alter the status quo over the next several years.

This publication has been issued by Royal Bank of Canada on behalf of certain RBC ® companies that form part of the international network of RBC Wealth Management. You should carefully read any risk warnings or regulatory disclosures in this publication or in any other literature accompanying this publication or transmitted to you by Royal Bank of Canada, its affiliates or subsidiaries.

The information contained in this report has been compiled by Royal Bank of Canada and/or its affiliates from sources believed to be reliable, but no representation or warranty, express or implied is made to its accuracy, completeness or correctness. All opinions and estimates contained in this report are judgments as of the date of this report, are subject to change without notice and are provided in good faith but without legal responsibility. This report is not an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any securities. Past performance is not a guide to future performance, future returns are not guaranteed, and a loss of original capital may occur. Every province in Canada, state in the U.S. and most countries throughout the world have their own laws regulating the types of securities and other investment products which may be offered to their residents, as well as the process for doing so. As a result, any securities discussed in this report may not be eligible for sale in some jurisdictions. This report is not, and under no circumstances should be construed as, a solicitation to act as a securities broker or dealer in any jurisdiction by any person or company that is not legally permitted to carry on the business of a securities broker or dealer in that jurisdiction. Nothing in this report constitutes legal, accounting or tax advice or individually tailored investment advice.

This material is prepared for general circulation to clients, including clients who are affiliates of Royal Bank of Canada, and does not have regard to the particular circumstances or needs of any specific person who may read it. The investments or services contained in this report may not be suitable for you and it is recommended that you consult an independent investment advisor if you are in doubt about the suitability of such investments or services. To the full extent permitted by law neither Royal Bank of Canada nor any of its affiliates, nor any other person, accepts any liability whatsoever for any direct or consequential loss arising from any use of this report or the information contained herein. No matter contained in this document may be reproduced or copied by any means without the prior consent of Royal Bank of Canada.

Clients of United Kingdom companies may be entitled to compensation from the UK Financial Services Compensation Scheme if any of these entities cannot meet its obligations. This depends on the type of business and the circumstances of the claim. Most types of investment business are covered for up to a total of £85,000. The Channel Island subsidiaries are not covered by the UK Financial Services Compensation Scheme; the offices of Royal Bank of Canada (Channel Islands) Limited in Guernsey and Jersey are covered by the respective compensation schemes in these jurisdictions for deposit taking business only.

Related articles

Video: The de-dollarisation dilemma

Analysis 1 minute read
- Video: The de-dollarisation dilemma

Worlds apart: Risks and opportunities as deglobalisation looms

Analysis 5 minute read
- Worlds apart: Risks and opportunities as deglobalisation looms

China’s next act in a changing economic order

Analysis 18 minute read
- China’s next act in a changing economic order