Amid changes in the geopolitical order, the BRICS association is attempting to chart a new course. This article explains why its members – including the Eurasian troika of China, Russia, and India – believe a new multipolar world order is inevitable.
October 2, 2025
Kelly Bogdanova Vice President, Portfolio AnalystPortfolio Advisory Group – U.S.
Following is an executive summary of the complete “How BRICS sees the world” report, which is part of RBC’s ongoing “Worlds apart” series exploring trade fragmentation and deglobalisation risks, along with their ramifications for economies and investors.
There are signs the world is transitioning from a U.S. led Western unipolar order which had characterised much of the post-Cold War period, to a new multipolar framework where not only the U.S. and its Western allies shape global affairs, but other countries outside the West also have significant influence.
The intensifying strategic partnerships among BRICS countries are natural, predictable outgrowths of the ongoing shifts in the geopolitical and geo-economic orders.
Whether the post-Cold War “rules-based” international order can be extended amid these changes is up for debate and is a controversial topic in Washington, understandably. Analysts at the West’s leading interventionist-oriented foreign policy think tanks push back against the multipolar narrative and assert that the U.S. maintains its dominant role and primacy (a.k.a. hegemony).
Nevertheless, some prominent Americans, including retired General and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mark Milley, have acknowledged at least since 2023 that the multipolar world is already here.
The BRICS association, along with its cousin Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) entity – both of which include the large Eurasian troika of China, Russia, and India – are attempting to chart a new multipolar course.
BRICS has been expanding amid the geopolitical changes. It has grown from five members in 2023 to 10 members and 10 partners in 2025.
Members are Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
BRICS is not designed to be a formal economic and political bloc like the EU. Its members flatly reject the term “bloc.”
Nor is it designed to be a formal military security alliance like NATO or what is emerging in the EU. There is no military component whatsoever.
Public statements have made it clear that BRICS countries desire deeper trade, financial, strategic, diplomatic, and cultural ties with each other, and want to leverage the economic achievements that are already under their belts and may be ahead.
We assess that the association is only getting started and has the potential to integrate and expand further.
When measured in U.S. dollars, BRICS members represent five of the 20 largest economies in the world.
But when GDP is calculated by purchasing power parity (PPP), which attempts to adjust for the cost of living, BRICS member countries move higher in the ranks, representing five of the top eight economies.
In 2025, the 10 BRICS members are expected to make up almost 40 percent of global GDP compared to 28 percent for G7 nations, based on PPP calculations by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This gap is forecast to widen through 2030.
We think BRICS is too big to ignore.
GDP of the 10 BRICS members surpassed G7 GDP in 2015, and the IMF expects the gap to widen further. Even before BRICS membership expansion in 2024 and 2025, the previous five BRICS members had surpassed the G7 in 2019.
Source – RBC Wealth Management, International Monetary Fund; data as of 9/11/25; 2025–2030 are IMF projections
The line chart shows the proportion of global GDP contributed by the G7 group of nations and by 10 BRICS member countries annually from 1995 through 2030 based on purchasing power parity; data from 2025 through 2030 are based on International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections. In 1995, there was a very wide gap between the two groups with the G7 at 46% and BRICS at 20.5%. The G7’s GDP as a proportion of global GDP has declined meaningfully since then, while the BRICS countries’ proportion of global GDP has steadily climbed. The IMF projects this trend will continue through its forecast period of 2030. The 10 BRICS countries’ share of global GDP surpassed the G7 in 2015 when BRICS reached 33.4%. By 2024, the G7 share had declined to 28.9% and BRICS had increased to 39.2%. By 2030, the IMF projects the G7 share will decline to 26.3% and BRICS will rise to 41.8%.
Despite significant press and blog attention over the years about the potential creation of a single BRICS currency, this is still not formally being considered.
However, three BRICS currency-related initiatives could further reduce the proportion of global trade in U.S. dollars and within the Western-backed SWIFT payments network.
BRICS countries repeatedly emphasise they are firmly against using currencies – the U.S. dollar in particular – as a foreign policy weapon, and this shapes their currency-related initiatives.
BRICS is not a panacea for any of the countries involved.
However, by participating in the association, countries have many more opportunities to engage in bilateral investment, trade, and diplomatic discussions, and people-to-people exchanges, than they otherwise would if the association didn’t exist.
For example, the recent progress between China and India to resolve their longstanding border dispute and improve relations has been facilitated by BRICS and SCO participation.
The entrance of Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian countries into the broader BRICS association in 2024 and 2025 – particularly the UAE, Indonesia, and Malaysia – has enhanced the group notably and opened many more economic opportunities, in our assessment.
The involvement of these regions, along with those in Africa and Latin/South America, integrates BRICS more deeply into the so-called “global majority.”
BRICS and the SCO are becoming leading platforms for “Global South” countries to have a bigger voice in world affairs. This will likely be BRICS’ focus in 2026 when India assumes the rotating presidency.
West-aligned countries are the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the European Union (27 countries), Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. BRICS groups based on 10 member and 10 partner countries.
Source – RBC Wealth Management; data as of 7/2/25 based on United Nations Population Division estimates for all countries, except EU countries based on Trading Economics’ projections
The area chart shows the following population groups as a percentage of global population: BRICS members, 47.9%; BRICS partners, 7.1%; West-aligned countries, 15.0%; other countries, 30.0%.
BRICS members and partners have specific domestic development programmes in multiple directions to shore up their own sovereignty and national security, some backed by big fiscal spending. These include technological, energy, agriculture, health, metals/minerals, and financial security initiatives. Ironically, America under Trump 2.0 is also attempting to shore up its own sovereignty in many of the same areas.
BRICS’ priority on sovereignty was recently demonstrated by the most active and intense level of coordination between and among members that we have seen in the association’s history.
This occurred after the Trump administration threatened and then imposed extra tariffs on Brazil due to disagreements about the country’s domestic political and judicial affairs, and on India for geopolitical reasons due to its relations with Russia and purchases of Russian crude oil during the Ukraine crisis.
India and Brazil strongly pushed back against these tariffs, citing violations of their sovereignty. China also stated multiple times that it would not succumb to pressure regarding its trade relations with Russia or any other country.
These events and other tariff threats on the association as a whole caused quite a stir within and among BRICS countries because they are viewed as de facto economic sanctions.
We think any use of “tariffs as sanctions” – whether by the U.S., European countries, or other Western nations – could continue to backfire.
The fallout from these disputes and high tariff rates in general are hastening integration within BRICS and the SCO, and we think these issues will ultimately incentivise more countries to push harder to achieve a multipolar global order sooner rather than later.
BRICS’ ongoing integration and development, combined with increasing U.S. trade protectionism since 2018, reinforces our belief that a potential shift to a multipolar, more fragmented world order argues for a new way of thinking.
Investment portfolio allocations should be viewed through a different lens. Sub-asset class allocations within equities and fixed income should no longer be assessed through the lens of cooperative globalisation that occurred in previous decades, as we don’t think that era is coming back anytime soon.
This translates into three practical implementations in investment portfolios:
For in-depth information, including a list of industries that could benefit, please review the full report: How BRICS sees the world .
We want to talk about your financial future.
This publication has been issued by RBC’s Wealth Management international division in the United Kingdom and the Channel Islands which is comprised of an international network of RBC® companies located in these jurisdictions and includes RBC Europe Limited and Royal Bank of Canada (Channel Islands) Limited. You should carefully read any risk warnings or regulatory disclosures in this publication or in any other literature accompanying this publication or transmitted to you by RBC’s Wealth Management international division.
This publication has been compiled from sources believed to be reliable, but no representation or warranty, express or implied is made to its accuracy, completeness or correctness. All opinions and estimates contained in this report are judgements as of the date of this report, are subject to change without notice and are provided in good faith but without legal responsibility. This report is not an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any securities. Past performance is not a guide to future performance, the value of investments and income arising can go down, future returns are not guaranteed, and an investor may not get back the amount originally invested. Countries throughout the world have their own laws regulating the types of securities and other investment products and services which may be offered to their residents, as well as the process for doing so. As a result, any securities or services discussed in this report may not be eligible for sale in some jurisdictions. This report is not, and under no circumstances should be construed as, a solicitation to act as a securities broker or dealer in any jurisdiction by any person or company that is not legally permitted to carry on the business of a securities broker or dealer in that jurisdiction. Nothing in this report constitutes legal, accounting or tax advice or individually tailored investment advice.
This material is prepared for general circulation and does not have regard to the particular circumstances or needs of any specific person who may read it. The investments or services contained in this report may not be suitable for you and it is recommended that you consult an independent investment advisor if you are in doubt about the suitability of such investments or services. To the full extent permitted by law none of the entities which comprise the international division of RBC Wealth Management nor any of their affiliates, nor any other person, accepts any liability whatsoever for any direct or consequential loss arising from any use of this report or the information contained herein. No matter contained in this document may be reproduced or copied by any means without the prior consent of RBC Wealth Management.
Clients of RBC Europe Limited may be entitled to compensation from the UK Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) if it cannot meet its obligations. This depends on the type of business and the circumstances of the claim. Most types of investment business are covered for up to a total of £85,000. For further information about the compensation provided by the FSCS scheme (including the amounts covered and eligibility to claim) please refer to the FSCS website FSCS.org.uk. Please note only compensation related queries should be directed to the FSCS. Royal Bank of Canada (Channel Islands) Limited is not covered by the UK Financial Services Compensation Scheme.
RBC Europe Limited is registered in England and Wales with company number 995939. Its registered office is 100 Bishopsgate, London EC2N 4AA. RBC Europe Limited is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority.
Royal Bank of Canada (Channel Islands) Limited (“the Bank”) is regulated by the Jersey Financial Services Commission in the conduct of deposit taking, fund services and investment business in Jersey. The Bank’s general terms and conditions are updated from time to time and can be found at https://www.rbcwealthmanagement.com/en-eu/terms-and-conditions. Registered office: Gaspé House, 66-72 Esplanade, St. Helier, Jersey JE2 3QT, Channel Islands. Deposits made with Royal Bank of Canada (Channel Islands) Limited in Jersey are not covered by the UK Financial Services Compensation Scheme. Royal Bank of Canada (Channel Islands) Limited is a participant in the Jersey Bank Depositors Compensation Scheme. The Scheme offers protection for ‘eligible deposits’ up to £50,000 per individual claimant, subject to certain limitations. The maximum total amount of compensation is capped at £100,000,000 in any 5 year period. Full details of the Scheme and banking groups covered are available on the Government of Jersey’s website http://www.gov.je/dcs or on request.
Investment services offered by the Bank are not covered by an investor compensation scheme as there is currently no such scheme operating in Jersey, however ‘eligible deposits’ held pursuant to investment services may be protected under the Bank Depositors Compensation Scheme described above – for more information see the Bank’s general terms and conditions. Some of the products that the Bank might recommend to you could be registered overseas and may be covered by a local compensation scheme. Your investment counsellor will provide you with the details of any overseas compensation schemes (where applicable) at the time of making an investment recommendation.
Copies of the latest audited accounts are available upon request from the registered office. ® / ™ Trademark(s) of Royal Bank of Canada. Used under licence.