How U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs would impact Canada’s economy

By Nathan Janzen

Just a week after the threat of blanket 25 percent tariffs on imports from Canada were avoided, the Trump administration announced significant 25 percent tariffs on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum products from key trade partners including Canada that comes into effect on March 12.¹

Unlike the threat of broad-based tariffs on all imports, there is recent historical precedence for U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum products. Indeed, the latest tariff threat is a direct extension of Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act used to implement steel and aluminum tariffs in 2018-19 , but aluminum tariffs have been bumped up from 10 percent in that earlier period to 25 percent.

As in 2018-19, the measures will be challenging for steel and aluminum producers, and will increase costs across the industries that buy those products, particularly in the North American manufacturing sector. But, if the experience of the 2018-19 tariff hikes is any guide , much of the cost will be paid by U.S. purchasers of tariffed products, limiting the negative impact on U.S. trade partners, including Canada.

The broader worry is that international trade uncertainty is not going away. As we discussed here , U.S. trade policy is likely to remain a significant source of uncertainty for the industrial sector with negative implications for business investment in Canada and on medium-term productivity growth. Even with the ambiguity of trade relations going forward, here’s what we think the implications of U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs are on Canada.

Canada is very exposed to U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs

Using the specific product list the U.S. targeted with tariffs in 2018-19, the U.S. accounts for over 90 percent of Canadian steel and aluminum exports. By our count, the renewal of the tariffs from 2018-19 would apply to roughly $24 billion of Canadian exports.

But that sensitivity runs both ways. Canada is the largest U.S. import market, worth US$7.5 billion in steel and $9.4 billion in aluminum products in 2024. Canada accounts for about a fifth of U.S. imports of steel and 50 percent of aluminum imports.

Moreover, Canada and U.S. steel trade is relatively balanced. Canada is the second largest export market for U.S. steel products, but is a larger net exporter of aluminum to the U.S. Canada’s total 2024 trade balance in steel and aluminum products (those targeted with tariffs) was $14 billion, with $11 billion from the aluminum trade.

U.S. iron and steel imports by country

$U.S. billions, 2024

Canada/U.S. steel and aluminum trade balance

$CAD billions, exports of steel and aluminum products targeted with section 232 tariffs in 2018

But sectors are a small share of trade and GDP

The tariffs being imposed are significant, and will have implications for the Canadian steel and aluminum sectors, but as we noted in our tariff playbook , size matters when it comes to assessing the broader economic impact of tariff increases. Steel and aluminum together account for just about 0.5 percent of Canadian gross domestic product and jobs, and about three percent of Canadian exports. Quebec and Ontario are the most exposed provinces where these industries represent one percent and 0.6 percent of GDP, respectively.

U.S. producers have limited options

For directly impacted industries, the next step in thinking through the impact of tariffs is to consider how easy it is for importers to find alternative import markets. The 2018-19 tariff spat over steel and aluminum showed substituting to alternative suppliers or products was very difficult, leaving U.S. importers with little choice but to pay higher costs.

Most other suppliers of U.S. steel will also be subject to higher tariffs, and it’s very difficult for U.S. producers to increase production capacity quickly. Specific steel and aluminum products can also be highly specialized, and difficult to substitute.

U.S. imports of steel products targeted with 25 percent tariffs actually rose in 2018, and the share coming from Europe, Canada and Mexico increased slightly . Canadian employment in steel and aluminum product industries rose by almost four percent in 2018 and another six percent in 2019. U.S. steel and aluminum production capacity actually declined over the period that tariffs were in place on the largest U.S. import markets.

Retaliatory measures to have upward but manageable impact on Canadian prices

In the prior round of steel and aluminum trade disruptions, Canada responded dollar for dollar to U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum products—slapping tariffs on almost $17 billion of annual Canadian imports from the U.S.

Similar measures today would mean Canadian retaliatory tariffs on imports of about $24 billion. That would raise prices for Canadian purchasers, but it would still be a small share (three percent) of total Canadian imports, and most of Canadian final consumption (about 80 percent ) is from domestic rather than foreign value-added production.

Prices would rise, particularly for intermediate products in industrial chains, but likely not enough to have a significantly destabilizing effect on the economy.

Broader impact of targeted tariffs is growing investment uncertainty

We argued in 2018-19 that the broader cost of targeted tariff increases, like those being imposed on steel and aluminum products, is that it increases uncertainty, weighing on business investment. That is still true today.

But Canadian investment is in a substantially worse shape now than it was then after being hit by a global pandemic, followed by an underperforming economy over the last two years. Weaker business investment threatens to extend a long run of productivity underperformance, and ultimately, weaker Canadian worker wages compared to other parts of the world.

U.S. steel and aluminum production capacity

% of 2017 output

¹ A Canada-U.S. side deal agreed to as part of the USMCA trade agreement in the first Trump administration provided Canada with a 60-day delay before Section 232 tariffs could be implemented, but it’s unclear if that “cooling off” period will apply.

Nathan Janzen is an assistant chief economist, leading the macroeconomic analysis group. His focus is on analysis and forecasting macroeconomic developments in Canada and the United States.

This article was originally published on thoughtleadership.rbc.com .

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